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ABSTRACT 
Franchising is an effective means of distribution and offers many economic benefits. It also 
poses a threat to the competitive process because of the restrictions that the concept 
requires the parties to accept. New Zealand's way of regulating this tension is examined 
and compared with the treatment accorded franchises under European Community law. 
After the subject is introduced, Part II addresses definition, finding it a difficult issue 
because franchising is an evolving concept. Part III details some of the vertical and 
horizontal restraints found in franchising. Part IV examines three non-price vertical 
restraints. After a period of controversy the law's approach is now reasonably settled and, 
on the basis of the leading New Zealand case, likely to be tolerant. Part V examines 
vertical price restraints, identifying problematic aspects of the current law. Part VI looks at 
horizontal restraints, especially market allocation. The potential impact of the proposal to 
make it illegal per se is considered. Part VII deals with European competition law as a 
prelude to a consideration of the treatment of key vertical restraints under it in Part VIII 
Part IX outlines reforms to the regulation of vertical restraints currently under 
consideration in Europe. Part X establishes a framework for evaluating the New Zealand 
and European approaches and that evaluation is presented in Part XI. Part XII concludes 
that the European search for a system that provides legal certainty is admirable and that 
the theoretical basis of their intended reforms is sound. Franchising in New Zealand is, 
nonetheless, better off under the existing system where the focus is on the economic effects 
of agreements, Europe having proven the futility of an approach based on the form of the 
distribution arrangement. 
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I THE FRANCHISING PHENOMENON 
A Origins 
Franchising is a phenomenon of post World War II commerce. Its modernity is 
illustrated by the absence of its commercial meaning from the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. 1 
That meaning is derived from the practice of American cities, developed in the early 
nineteenth century, of granting a monopoly licence or "concession" over a public utility 
such as a canal or railroad. That, in turn, was an adaption of the practice, dating back to 
feudal times, of the sovereign granting freedoms or privileges, the term being the Old 
French for the state of freedom. 2 The notion of granting a privilege - usually in the form of 
a licence - is fundamental to franchising although disgruntled franchisees may regard 
franchising as closer to economic serfdom than economic freedom. The roots of the modem 
commercial practice are unclear but it possibly emerged as early as the 1850s with Singer 
sewing machines3 or with the licensing of beer gardens by breweries.4 Well established by 
the tum of the century in the United States, it did not emigrate much until the 1950s. 
B Reasons 
A business has achieved success in retailing a good or service. Its outlets are 
distinctive and it has in place effective management systems. It wants to satisfy unfulfilled 
demand before competitors enter the market but is concerned about the risk entailed in 
raising capital. It also has a small management team and worries about how the dynamics 
will be affected if it is greatly expanded. Franchising offers a means by which rapid growth 
can be achieved, capital demands reduced and management problems minimised. The 
business gains a network of motivated owner/operators who work a market that they 
probably know well because they live in it.5 Franchising works because it is an effective 
marriage of big and small business; both parties benefit. 
C Economic Benefits 
Franchising is an effective method of distribution, enabling market penetration to be 
achieved quickly and flexibly. It enables a firm to respond quickly to a market opportunity 
where a first mover may be enjoying monopoly profits. It supports innovation and 
enterprise. Franchises deal in knowledge, the notion of some special knowledge being 
shared between the parties lying at the heart of the franchising concept: it might, therefore, 
be considered to be particularly apt in a society aspiring to develop a knowledge economy. 
It also encourages innovation and enterprise through risk sharing and risk minimisation, 
franchises escaping the high infant mortality of other small business ventures. 6 Franchising 
1 1992 edition; revised 1973, 801 
2 Shorter Oxford Dictionary, above n 1. 
3 Robert W. Emerson, "Franchisee Collective Rights" 43 Vanderbilt LR 1990 1503, 1507 
4 Harold Brown, Franchising: Realities and Remedies (2°d ed.) 1978, 1. 
5 "Our people can get up to 50% more sales from a store than we could if there was a manager in there and 
head office was doing the buying." Colin Taylor, founder of Stirling Sports, quoted in "Franchise 
Master", New Zealand Business, March 1999 20,22. 
6 Win Robinson, Chairman of the NZ Franchise Association, claims around 80% of franchises survive the first 
five years compared with a failure rate of 80% in independent businesses. "Franchise option grows in 
poularity" The Independent 22 September 1999, 22. 
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can contribute to consumer welfare by expanding the choice available (the rapid growth in 
home service being an example) and reducing the costs of goods and services. Streamlined 
processes that do not have to be developed anew by each operator reduce input costs. 
Finally, franchising contributes to employment growth. Traditional career employment is in 
decline. Franchising provides opportunities for self-employment to those made redundant 
as well as opportunities for employment generally. 
D Competition Issues 
Set against these economic benefits must be questions about franchising's 
compatibility with the competitive process. Franchising involves a network of firms 
agreeing to operate in the same or similar fashion. The express aim is often to make 
customers feel like they are dealing with a single enterprise. Achieving this, however, 
requires highly prescriptive operational methods, usually via a manual, removing much of 
the franchisee's choice over how to conduct their business. Franchisees are also often 
required to supply information, especially about sales, that would normally be confidential 
to a legally independent owner. It is this element of collaboration that excites competition 
law's interest because: 
"[the Commerce] Act is based on the premise that society's resources are 
best allocated in a competitive market where rivalry between firms ensures 
maximum efficiency in the use ofresources".7 
This paper explores whether the tension between these two aspects of franchising 1s 
accommodated more effectively under New Zealand or European Community law. 
1 
Tru Tone Ltd & Ors v Festival Records Retail Marketing Ltd [1988] 2NZLR 352, 358 
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II IN SEARCH OF DEFINITION 
A Various Forms 
Defining a franchise is more complex than might be assumed from the currency 
which the term has achieved. First, there can be franchises at different functional levels. 
Coca-Cola has traditionally franchised both production and distribution to regionally based 
bottlers. Second, a franchise itself can be implemented organisationally in a multi-level 
way, with a franchisor licensing a master franchisee who licences franchisees . The biggest 
difficulty, however, is caused by the fact that franchising is an evolving concept. 
B Core Features 
Definitions of franchising can be found m texts, 8 m industry codes9 and m 
legislation. 10 They all build on three key features. 
The first is the ownership by the franchisor of a trademark, brand name or some 
distinctive sign, presentation or business method. The second is the grant of a licence to 
legally independent retailers to use the trademark or other special property in return for 
some form of payment in order to provide retail goods or services. The third is that an 
ongoing contractual relationship exists between the franchisor and franchisee of significant 
duration that specifies obligations on each over the way the business operates. 
These features provide only the most basic framework, leaving many questions 
unanswered. There are, however, two main types of franchises recognised in the literature. 
C Business Format 
The definition of franchising in European Community law is narrow. 11 It limits the 
special exemption provided for franchising to systems in which the use of the franchisor's 
"know-how" and continuing assistance mean franchisees use a common business format 
specified by the franchisor. Know-how means a package of non-patented practical 
information, resulting from experience and testing by the franchisor, which is secret, 
substantial and identified. 12 The prototype is the fast food chain. 
D Product and Trade Name 
Usage outside Europe is broader. Almost any arrangement that involves a close 
relationshir between the parties and the extensive use of a name or logo is regarded as a 
franchise. 1 In practice, it means the term includes other distribution methods, such as 
8 Brown, above n4, 13 
9 Franchising Code of Conduct under Part IVB of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
10 At least 16 states in the United States have legislation on aspects franchising. See Emerson, above n3, 1509. 11 Article 1(3), Commission Regulation 4087/88 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories 
of franchise agreements, OJ L359/88. 
12 Regulation 4087 /88, above n 11 
13 Competition Policy and Vertical Restraints -Franchising Agreements, OECD Report 1994, 21. 
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exclusive distribution 14 and selective distribution, 15 which the Europeans are careful to 
distinguish from franchising. A car dealership qualifies as a franchise in New Zealand 
whereas in Europe it is regarded as a form of selective distribution. 16 
E Agencies 
There seems general acceptance that an agency arrangement is legally incompatible 
with franchising. By definition, there is no grant of a licence to an agent. This may be too 
sweeping. Agencies vary in their character. Both TAB and Lotto outlets are conducted on 
franchising lines notwithstanding that they are technically agents for the statutory principals 
concerned. In the case of Lotto outlets especially the business is owned by the operator 
whose goodwill is often determined by lottery sales, indicating that she accepts a high 
degree of risk. They can hardly be bracketed with dry cleaning agencies and newsagents. 
F Banner Groups 
These are retailers that combine to buy trading goods and promote their activities 
under a common banner but otherwise have considerable autonomy in the way they do 
business. Typically they have full freedom over the lines they sell outside some key in-
house products. The emphasis is less on service delivery and more on maximising 
purchasing power and sharing information for mutual benefit. Booksellers (Paper Plus) and 
pharmacies (Amcal, Unichem) are examples. Clearly, they do not qualify as a business 
format franchise and it can be queried whether they fall within the definition of a product or 
trade name franchise, being a collection of horizontal relationships. Eagles, however, has 
no doubts. 
"Sometimes there may be no franchisor, simply a group of independent businesses 
conducting themselves under a single name in a uniform style." 17 
G Joint Ventures 
It has also been suggested that a franchise is akin to a joint venture. 
"In a real sense, a franchise agreement is a joint venture between the franchisor and 
the franchisee, and sometimes between the franchisee as well. In those 
circumstances, I wonder whether a normal incident of the organisation of such a 
business is easily subject to review under the Commerce Act." 18 
The comment seems to imply that franchises should enjoy some exemption from 
competition law. Possibly too much should not be read into the comments given that they 
were made in dealing with a weak defence. 
14 Appointment of a single distributor in a territory. 
15 Appointment of a distributor satisfying specified, usually qualitative, criteria. 
16 Car dealing is the subject of Regulation 123/85 . 
17 Eagles, Ian, "Franchising and the Commerce Act 1986 (1)" 1986 NZLJ 349, 350. 18 Washworld Corporation (Leases) Ltd v Reid (1998) 8 TCLR 372,387. 
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H Conclusion 
The foregoing illustrates the difficulty encountered in giving legal expression to a 
form of business organisation that is still evolving. Where the boundaries are, in reality, is 
anyone's guess. 
"Given that franchising is a dynamic and innovative way of doing business, it is 
inevitable that the boundaries ..... will always be in a state of change or evolution. 
Thus, trying to identify the precise boundaries at any point of time will be a matter 
of conjecture and subject to controversy." 19 
In this paper, "franchise" is taken to encompass both business format and product 
and trade name types, except where otherwise stated. 
19 Frank Zumbo, "A Franchising Code?" 1999 NZLJ 251 ,252. 
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III FRANCHISING AND THE LAW 
A New Zealand Competition Law Framework 
New Zealand evaluates all competition issues within the same analytical framework 
and according to the same legal standards. The Commerce Act 198620 recognises no 
distinctions between the production, distribution and retail components of the supply chain 
and consequently has no need to distinguish between franchising and other forms of 
distribution. All market behaviour is judged according to two basic tests. The first is 
whether a dominant market position has been used anti-competitively. 21 The second is 
whether contracts, arrangements or understandings entered into (hereafter "agreements") 
have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. 22 
B Substantially Lessening Competition 
The test requires a comparative analysis. The state of the market before and after the 
conduct in question must be examined to determine whether there has been, or is likely to 
be, a substantial lessening of competition.23 "Likely" means "would be likely", "could well 
happen", "more than mere possibility" but the chance need not be more probable than not or 
more than a 50% chance. 24 The loss of competition must be "more than trivial or 
minimal".25 The effect on competition is assessed on a net basis, the pro and anti 
competition effects being balanced against each other.26 
Three practices are identified specifically. Resale price maintenance is declared 
unlawful in itself7 while exclusionary agreements28 and price fixing29 are "deemed" to 
substantially lessen competition and therefore breach section 27. All the prohibitions in 
sections 27, 29, 30 and 37 are mitigated by the availability of the authorisation procedure. 30 
C Vertical and Horizontal Restraints 
1 Vertical restraints 
Vertical restraints are restrictions that apply between parties at different functional 
levels in the distribution chain. The franchisor may insist that the franchisee deal 
exclusively in her products. A franchisor may tie the supply of one product to another; a 
popular product may only be supplied if a less popular one is also taken. The franchisee 
20 Hereafter referred to as "the Act". References to sections are those in the Act unless otherwise designated. 21 
Section 36. 
22 
Section 27 
23 
Tru Tone, above n7. 
24 
Broadcast Communications Ltd v Commerce Commission (1991) 4 TCLR 537 
25 
Commerce Commission v Port Nelson (1995) 5 NZBLC 103,762 
26 
Fisher & Paykel v Commerce Commission [1990] 2 NZLR 731 
27 
Section 3 7 
28 
Section 29 
29 
Section 30 
30 
Section 58. 
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may be allocated a territory within which she is given exclusive rights to deal in the product. 
Conditions may be imposed on which customers a franchisee can sell to. The franchisor 
may wish to stipulate the price at which a franchise can sell products or the products that 
must be excluded from price focused advertising. 
2 Horizontal restraints 
Horizontal restraints, on the other hand, are ones entered into between parties at the 
same functional level. Examples are agreements between franchisees to prevent a 
competitor obtaining supply (boycott), divide a market between them (market allocation) or 
agree on prices or discounts (price fixing). 
3 Horizontal restrictions disguised as vertical. 
The ostensibly neat distinction between vertical and horizontal restraints needs to be 
approached with care. Competing franchisors can use their systems of vertical 
arrangements as a means of implementing an anti-competitive arrangement. Or, a restraint 
may be imposed on a franchisee by a franchisor at the insistence of other franchisees. These 
are instances of horizontal restraints being imposed in the guise of vertical ones. The search 
for the horizontal in the ostensibly vertical is an important aspect of the law regarding 
restrictive practices. 
4 Aggregation 
It is not the individual practices that are important necessarily but the totality of their 
impact. 31 Many cases will involve a collection ofrestrictive practices any of which on their 
own might be innocuous but which in combination have the effect of substantially lessening 
competition. 
D United States Precedent 
The United States is the font of antitrust jurisprudence and the jurisdiction dominates 
the subject in terms of cases and commentary. A feature of United States antitrust law is the 
per se/rule of reason dichotomy. The Supreme Court decided early on that the prohibition 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890 of "every" agreement in "restraint of trade" 
prohibited only agreements that unreasonably restrain trade.32 Evaluating whether the 
restraint is reasonable or unreasonable has become known as applying the "rule of reason". 
However, the law has also developed the doctrine that certain kinds of agreements will so 
rarely prove justified that the law does not require proof that an agreement of that kind is 
anti-competitive in the particular circumstances. Such an agreement is regarded as unlawful 
per se.33 
3 1 
Section 3(5) 
32 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v United States (1911) 221 US 1, 55 L. Ed., 619. 
33 Nynex Corporation. v Discon, Inc (1998) 142 LED 2d 510 is a recent authority. 
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IV VERTICAL NON-PRICE RESTRAINTS 
A The Economics 
The proper way for the law to treat vertical non-price restraints has been one of the 
great debates in antitrust over the last forty years. 
1 Structural approach 
Traditionally, United States courts drew little distinction between horizontal and 
vertical arrangements, regarding both as sinister. Economists explained economic 
behaviour in terms of the exercise of market power34 and any move that increased market 
power was, accordingly, viewed with suspicion. The courts from the 1940's onward 
characterised an increasing number of practices as unlawful per se, the high water mark 
being the 1967 ruling that all non-price vertical restraints were per se violations of the 
Sherman Act. 35 
2 "Chicago School" approach 
During the 1960s, economists associated with the University of Chicago postulated 
that high market power was often simply the result of improving efficiency, particularly 
through the elimination of transaction costs. One means of achieving this was to enter into 
contractual arrangements that were more efficient than direct vertical integration. High 
market power could not, by itself, be categorised as inevitably leading to reduced 
competition: rather, each case required specific examination to see whether anti-competitive 
injury had occurred. In 1977 the Supreme Court reversed its earlier ruling and declared that 
thereafter non-price vertical restraints would be evaluated under a rule of reason approach 
because of their potential to be pro-competitive. 36 Sylvania drew a fundamental distinction 
between interbrand competition (competition between brands) and intrabrand competition 
(competition within brands). Vertical non-price restraints generally encourage the former 
(regarded as more important) but hinder the latter (regarded as less important). 
3 Post "Chicago School" 
The US courts continue in the Sylvania tradition, the Supreme Court recently 
reaffirming that the general purpose of antitrust laws is the protection of interbrand 
competition.37 However, a retreat from a strict "Chicago School" approach is also evident. 
"Though the treatment of vertical restraints and mergers in the United States 
historically has not been clear and consistent, I think we have now arrived at a 
sensible approach. We no longer condemn vertical arrangements without regard to 
their efficiencies. Neither, however, do we allow theoretical economic efficiencies 
34 
For example, J Chamberlain, Theory of Monopolistic Competition, (1st ed., 1933) 35 
United States v Arnold, Schwinn & Co 388 US 365 (1967). 
36 
Continental TV. , Inc. v GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 US 36 (1977). Hereafter "Sylvania". 37 
State Oil v Khan (1997) 139 L Ed 2d 199 
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to blind us to the possible anticompetitive effects of a vertical restraint or merger."38 
(Emphasis added.) 
Under this analysis, vertical non-price restraints can cause harm in two basic ways. 
"First they can facilitate collusion among competitors by helping competitors to 
overcome obstacles they would otherwise face in attempting to maintain prices 
above competitive levels. Second, they can raise competitors' costs. By foreclosing 
or disadvantaging competing firms, vertical restraints create barriers to entry or 
expansion, so that rivals can no longer discipline the offending firm's price 
increases. We accordingly analyse vertical restraints in two categories - those that 
can lead to collusion and those that can lead to exclusion."39 (Emphasis added) 
Berry4° reaches a similar conclusion in commenting on the vertical aspects of 
mergers. He notes the acceptance of the United States Department of Justice Merger 
Guidelines (1984)41 which were tolerant of vertical non-price restraints, citing as an 
example the recourse had to them by the Commission in Dunlop. 42 
"It follows, adopting this approach, that there are only two ways that vertical 
integration can harm competition. The first is by increasing barriers to entry 
such that (1) the merger must create foreclosure to the extent that a rival must 
enter both [ downstream and upstream] markets to compete, (2) it must be 
significantly more difficult to enter both markets than just one, and (3) the 
existing market must be concentrated. The second major concern about 
vertical integration is that it may facilitate collusion in circumstances where 
vertical inteyation is widespread and where market concentration is 
significant. "4 
B Exclusive Dealing 
Exclusive dealing is an arrangement under which "customer firms agree to deal 
solely in one suppliers product".44 It is the norm in petrol retailing and used to be common 
with beer supplied to hotels . Strictly, suppliers may enter into as many such arrangements 
as they like but in practice they will normally observe some restriction as to territory or type 
of customer supplied such that the purchaser enjoys a benefit. 
38 Pitofsky, Robert, "Vertical Restraints and Vertical Aspects of Mergers - A US Perspective" Prepared 
Remarks at 24th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute 16-17 October 1997 <http://www.ftc .gov/speeches/pitofsky/fordham>. Pitofsky is Chairman, 
Federal Trade Commission. 
39 Pitofsky, above n38 . 
40 Mark N. Berry, "The Impact of Economics on Competition Law in New Zealand: Some Reflections on the 
First Decade" ( 1996) 26 VUWLR 17. 
41 4 Trade Reg Rep (CCH) para 13,103 (1984) 
4' - Dunlop New Zealand Ltd/Goodyear New Zealand Ltd (1987) 1 NZBLC (Com) para 99-513 43 Berry, above n40, 33 
44 Rex J Ahdar, "Exclusive Dealing and the Fisher & Paykel Saga" 15 NZULR 1, 1 
II 
I Effects 
Historically, the courts have been hostile to such arrangements for, by definition, 
they block rival suppliers from access to the customers locked in to them for their term.45 
Another major concern is the potential for facilitating collusion between supplier cartels. 
When all purchasers are locked in to individual members of the cartel, any increased 
demand generated by one purchaser reducing prices will quickly be detected by the supplier. 
The possibility of the purchaser cheating on the cartel is largely eliminated.46 There are also 
claims that exclusive arrangements can be harmful because they diminish dealer and 
consumer choice47 and that they keep prices higher than would otherwise be the case.48 
It has also long been recognised that exclusive dealing can enhance efficiency. 
Buyers can be assured of supply, protected against price rises, avoid the need to hold 
inventory, and can plan on the basis of known cost. Sellers can reduce their costs and 
protect themselves against falling markets.49 In sum, exclusive dealing can establish price 
certainty and reduce transaction costs. It can also be a means of preventing free riding in 
circumstances where a supplier invests in special retail equipment to help sell a product and 
seeks to ensure that rival products do not take advantage of it.50 
2 United States approach 
Tampa Electric51 is significant in terms of establishing an analytical approach. After 
defining the market, the Supreme Court asked the question whether the contract concerned 
foreclosed competition in a "substantial share of the relevant market". 52 It said that 
"opportunities for other traders to enter into or remain in that market must be significantly 
limited" before it would find the arrangement unlawful. In determining what was 
"substantial" the relevant factors were the strength of the parties, the percentage of 
commerce involved and the likely present and future effects of foreclosure on competition 
in the market. Relief was denied; the dealings involved less than 1 % of the market for coal. 
3 Fisher & Paykel Ltd. v Commerce Commission 53 
This is the leading case on exclusive dealing, specifically, and vertical non-price 
restraints, generally, in New Zealand. It appears to be the only case in which these matters 
have been subjected to close analysis. 
45 
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v Healthsource, Inc, (1993) 986 F.2d 589,595 (1 51 Cir.). 46 Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice 384-5 (1994) 47 Ahdar, above n44, 12-13 
48 Ahdar, above n44, 13-14 
49 These benefits were enunciated in Standard Oil Co. v United States, (1949) 337 U.S. 283 per Frankfurter J, 
306-7. Standard Oil lost even though its contracts covered only 6.7% of all petrol sales to retailers. 50 The line between pro- and anti-competitive is a fine one, however. Mars successfully complained about 
competitors with 25% market share using control of retailers'freezer cabinets to block their attempts to 
enter the German ice cream market. Mars v Scholler Lebensmittal 1994 CMLR 51 51 
Tampa Electric Co. v Nashville Coal Co., (1961) 365 U.S. 320 
52 
Tampa Electric, above n51 , 327-8. 
53 
Fisher & Paykel, above n 26 
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Fisher & Paykel Ltd. ("F&P") operated through exclusive dealing arrangements 
under which its dealers could not stock competing whiteware products. It was so pre-
eminent by the mid-1980s that it had 75% of the market for all whiteware goods and 55% of 
all whiteware retailers.54 Its exclusive dealing practice came under challenge prompting it 
to apply for authorisation. 
For the Commission, barriers to entry was the critical issue. Significant factors in 
this regard included F&P's securing of the principal nationwide chains and regional 
retailers; the difficulty that competitors would encounter in securing adequate retail space; 
the fervent support for F &P of their dealers (making it difficult for a competitor to lure 
dealers away) and the considerable sunk costs that a competitor would need to risk if it were 
to seriously challenge F&P. Taken together, these meant competitors faced severe barriers 
so the exclusive dealing practice had to be regarded as substantially lessening competition. 
The public benefits did not outweigh the anti-competitive effect meaning the application 
was declined. 
On appeal, the High Court formed a different view. F&P was a major competitor 
whose market power was diminishing. Rivals were not significantly foreclosed given their 
other retailing options and because F &P dealers could terminate the exclusive dealing 
arrangement on three months notice. The exclusive dealing practice did not, therefore, 
substantially lessen competition. 
The judgment has been criticised as wrongly decided and a setback for New Zealand 
competition law.55 Market share is not necessarily market power but it is startling that a 
restrictive practice should be condoned when used by a firm with a market share well 
beyond the level at which an assumption of dominance arises in a merger context. 56 The 
high benchmark it establishes is certainly favourable to any New Zealand franchise using 
the practice. Nonetheless, it cannot be said that decisions or developments in thinking in the 
decade since it was decided has shown it to be clearly wrong. 
It has been suggested that the court was unduly influenced by the Chicago School 
view of vertical restraints as pro-competitive.57 The 1990's have seen a retreat from this 
benevolence. 
"In the 1980s, the federal enforcement agencies viewed all exclusive deals with a 
generous eye, and brought no cases. But exclusive dealing arrangements are no 
longer off the enforcement table, at least when large percentages of the market are at 
stake and the duration is substantial."58 
54 
Fisher & Paykel, above n26, 754 
55 Ahdar, above n44, 2. 
56 Business Acquisition Guidelines, Commerce Commission 
57 Ahdar, above n44, 43 
58 Pitofsky, above n38 
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Pitofsky cites the example of two manufacturers that between them shared 90% of 
the United States' market for water pumps for fire engines. Each had used exclusive 
dealing contracts for fifty years. The FTC considered the contracts created barriers of entry 
that effectively foreclosed competitors from the market for fire pumps. The consent orders 
in those cases prohibited all present and future exclusive dealing arrangements. 59 A large 
percentage of the market was at stake in F&P and the duration of the exclusive dealing was 
substantial suggesting that the FTC might take a dim view if faced with the case today. 60 
However, there has been no other case that challenges Fisher & Paykel 's findings. 
The best test of the soundness of the decision is the market position of F &P today. 
The Commission and High Court both emphasised the inappropriateness of taking a 
"snapshot" view of competition. Ahdar, however, points out that focussing on the dynamic 
aspect of competition carries with it the danger that the timeframe for the expansion or entry 
of rivals and the decline of the incumbent's power will be extended too far. 61 Attempts to 
obtain precise information about the company's current market share of whiteware have 
been unsuccessful but its annual report suggests it is facing much greater competition than it 
did a decade ago. 
"The New Zealand market remained one of the most competitive in the world: with 
completely open borders, competition arrives from around the world."62 
Developments such as parallel importing in the period since the case would seem to support 
its logic. 
C Tying 
Tying can be a consequence of exclusive dealing. The purchaser who deals 
exclusively with one supplier may be unable to offer customers a choice. The Jefferson 
Parish hospital in New Orleans used the services of one anaestheseology practice only. It 
therefore tied the surgical services it offered to the use of that group of specialists: patients 
could not choose their own anaesthetist. 63 
Tying is not prohibited per se under the Act. The issue is under what circumstances 
will the action be considered to substantially lessen competition. There are no New Zealand 
cases and it is necessary to look to the United States and Australia for guidance. 
59 In the Matter of Waterous Company, Inc., Docket No. C-3693 (Nov 22, 1996); In the Matter of Hale 
Products, Inc., Docket No. C-3694 (Nov. 22, 1996). 
60 In Waterous, above n59, the FTC also considered the arrangement collusive and amounting to de facto 
market division. This was not a feature of Fisher & Paykel although it could be argued that F&P, with 
85% share in the important lines, had no one to collude with. 
61 
Ahdar, above n44, 40 
62 Fisher & Paykel Industries Limited Annual Report 1999, 8 
63 Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No 2 v Hyde, (1984) 466 U.S. 2, 80 L Ed 2d 2 
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I United States 
The difficulty in evaluating the United States cases lies in the fact that tying has long 
been regarded as illegal per se. 64 This remains strictly so despite the more tolerant attitude 
to vertical non-price restraints described above. There are many cases involving franchises. 
In Siegel, 65 a requirement that chicken pieces be sold only in wrapping paper supplied by 
the franchisor was struck down. The franchisor had unlawfully tied the wrapping to the 
grant of its trade mark. 
The strict application of the per se prohibition is softened by the attitude to 
characterisation and the admission of a business justification defence. 
(a) Characterisation 
In Jefferson Parish the Supreme Court observed:: 
"[T]he Sherman Act does not prohibit "tying"; it prohibits contract(s) .... in 
restraint of trade." Thus, in a sense the question whether this case involves 
"tying" is beside the point."66 
While careful to uphold the per se unlawful status, the Court ruled that the 
prohibition only applied once it had been established that a substantial potential for impact 
on competition exists. It said: 
" ... the essential characteristic of an invalid tying agreement lies in the 
seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer 
either into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer did not want at all, or 
might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms".67 
Neither of these applied. The seller (the hospital) could not exploit its control over 
surgical services because it had less than 30% of the surgical admissions in New Orleans. 
The court could not reach the conclusion that buyers (patients) were disadvantaged because 
it doubted that they regarded surgery and anaesthesea as separate products anyway. The 
decision has been described as rendering tying a per se violation "in name only".68 
(b) Business justification defence 
United States courts have accepted a reasonable business justification for tying. 69 
The most often accepted justification is that tying is necessary to ensure quality control. 
Brown explains this justification in terms of the Lanham Act70 under which a licensor is 
obliged to ensure the quality of the licensed product or process or risk forfeiting her 
64 International Salt Co. v United States (1947) 332 US 392, 92 L. Ed 2d 545 
65 Siegel v Chicken Delight Inc., (1971) 448 F2d 43, 47 (9th Cir.) 
66 Jefferson Parish, above n63, 19, footnote 34 per Stevens J 
67 Jefferson Parish, above n63, 13 per Stevens J 
68 Michael P Kenny and William H Jordan, "United States v Microsoft" 47 Emory LR 1998 1352, 1392 69 IBM v United States ( 1936) 298 US 131 
70 
15 USC 1055 (1964) 
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property interest. 71 However, limits are placed on this exemption from antitrust law. 
Business justification has been rejected when based on the preservation of goodwill or 
where the facts demonstrate that a less restrictive way of ensuring quality control is 
feasible. 72 
2 Australia 
In Double Bay Steakhouse 73 the Trade Practices Commission ("TPC") examined in 
detail the tying practices proposed in extending a restaurant franchise. The arrangements 
were cleared in relation to steaks, sauces and entrees as being necessary to ensure quality 
control but the franchiser felt obliged to withdraw restrictions relating to the purchase of 
equipment and complementary food items. Pengilley comments: 
"No one doubts that Kentucky Fried's eleven original herbs and spices should be a 
mandatory purchase by Kentucky Fried's franchisees. There is far less agreement, 
however, about whether it is appropriate for the franchisor to mandate the purchase 
of napkins, containers and bags from himself and no other source. These items are 
not necessary to protect the trade mark or the quality of the product."74 
These comments are used to support the conclusion that a franchisor must be able to 
justify a purchase restraint as being an integral part of the franchised method of business, or 
necessary for quality control or trade mark purposes.75 
3 New Zealand 
Although there is ample United States precedent for the Australian formulation it is 
submitted that it is too narrow and should not be adopted in New Zealand. It reflects a view 
that a franchisor will seek to exploit economic power over a franchisee. While always a 
possibility, the reality is that what a franchisor desires most is a successful, expanding 
franchise system. This motivation will normally outweigh any desire to exploit a short term 
advantage. Franchisors recognise that flexibility in supply arrangements is essential; tying 
up franchisees in restrictive arrangements will be ultimately self-defeating. Tying 
arrangements should be evaluated like any other non-price restraint, that is, assessed 
primarily in terms of foreclosure. 
D Territorial Restrictions 
Anyone establishing a distribution system must consider how best to achieve market 
coverage. Territorially based restrictions may be necessary if maximum effect is to be 
obtained at reasonable cost. Territorial restrictions are common in franchising for this 
reason and because one of the major inducements a franchisor can offer a franchisee is an 
exclusive territory in which to operate. 
71 Brown, above n4, 305. 
72 Capra, Inc. v Ward Foods, Inc (51h Cir. 1976), 536 F.2d 39. 
73 Double Bay Steak House Providores Pty Ltd (1976-1977) ATPR (Com.) 15,737. 
74 Pengilley, W "Franchising: The Present Law and the Likely Impact of Franchising Legislation" 1983 ABLR 
327, 342. 
75 J G Collinge and B R Clarke (Eds.) Law of Marketing in Australia and New Zealand, 2°d ed. [ 15 .56]. 
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Since Sylvania in 1977, United States Courts have assessed territorial restrictions 
with a generous heart. In 1962, Sylvania's share of the United States market for television 
sets had fallen to 2%. It initiated distribution through a limited number of franchisees and 
each was allowed to sell from specified locations only. Continental was one of the 
franchisees. Against Continental's wishes, Sylvania granted a new franchise to a dealer 
close to a Continental outlet in San Francisco. It also refused to grant Continental's new 
outlet in Sacramento a franchise. Continental claimed the territorial limitations were a per 
se breach of the Sherman Act, relying on Schwinn.76 In 1965 Sylvania's national market 
share had recovered to 5%. The Supreme Court, in a landmark judgment, held that the 
restrictions had to be evaluated on a rule of reason approach, recognising that they could be 
pro-competitive. 
The restrictions in Sylvania were relatively simple; the franchisees were restricted to 
designated locations and needed approval to change. Evaluation becomes more difficult 
when other restrictions are added. For example, only one franchisee may be appointed in a 
territory. For certain types of products and services, such as restaurants, intrabrand 
competition within the territory will be eliminated. The franchisee may be required to 
confine promotional and selling efforts to within the territory but be permitted to supply 
customers from outside the territory who approach her. Alternatively, "passive selling" may 
be prohibited, with the franchisee expected to redirect the customer to the franchisee within 
the customer's area of residence. Then again, franchisees may be obliged by their 
agreement not to sell to competitors of the franchisor or to supply other resellers. These 
latter arrangements graft further restrictive requirements onto the territorial framework. 
Exclusivity clauses were examined by the Commerce Commission in an inquiry into 
motor vehicle franchise agreements.77 All the agreements examined contained clauses 
allocating the dealer an exclusive territory.78 The Commission considered that "if anything, 
this type of restriction is likely to promote the competition which the dealer provides".79 It 
was more concerned, however, about restrictions on the dealer's place of business. 
"Ideally, we think the manufacturer's discretion to withhold consent should be 
limited, so that the dealer can change the location of his premises unless there are 
legitimate reasons, such as location, display, storage, security, general appearance 
and facilities . "80 
Despite the critical tone of the comment, the list is fairly extensive. 
Eagles suggests that a franchise for the whole of New Zealand unconnected with 
intellectual property rights would be looked at "askance". 81 
76 Schwinn, above n35 
77 Inquiry Into The Terms of Motor Vehicle Franchise Agreements, Commerce Commission 1985 . 78 Inquiry, above n77, 21. One agreement provided for an "infringement commission" on breach, the amount 
determined by the franchisor at its discretion. 
79 Inquily, above n77, 22 
80 Inquiry, above n77, 30 
81 Eagles, above n 17, 383 
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It is submitted that two factors will be salient in evaluating whether a vertically 
imposed territorial restraint is unacceptable. The first is the strength of interbrand 
competition: if this is strong, the more likely the clause will not be anti-competitive. 82 The 
second is the extent to which the territorial restraint is accompanied by other restrictions. 
The Australian Coca-Cola83 case illustrates the first point, if not the second. The case 
involved both exclusive dealing and territorial exclusivity. Franchisees could only sell 
within their own defined territory; they could not supply customers outside of it. The TPC 
found the pro-competitive effects outweighed any anti-competitive injury, noting that 
interbrand competition in soft drinks was particularly strong. It authorised the agreement 
accordingly. 
E Summary 
The law is more tolerant of vertical non-price restraints today than it was 25 years 
ago. Jefferson Parish can be interpreted broadly as creating a safe harbour for exclusive 
dealing up to a level of 30% market share in the United States and Fisher & Paykel 
accepted the practice when market share was much higher. Tying remains per se unlawful 
in the United States but the characterisation approach in Jefferson Parish limits its impact. 
Arguments can be made, regardless, that a more tolerant approach should be adopted. 
Territorial restrictions are treated generously in the United States at least when they are not 
laden with other restraints. Recent support can be found for the view that restraints in 
franchising can assist the competitive process. 84 Franchising has little to fear from the 
treatment of non-price vertical restraints under current law. 
82 
Eagles, above n 17, 383 
83 
( 1977-78) A TPR Commission Decisions 
84 
Washworld, above n18, 387. 
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V VERTICAL PRICE RESTRAINTS 
Unlawful in the United States since 1911,85 resale price maintenance ("RPM") has 
only been prohibited in New Zealand since 1975. 
A The Economics 
The per se treatment of RPM is controversial because many economists regard 
vertical price restraints in the same way as non-price ones, that is, they can be either pro- or 
anti-competitive depending on the circumstances.86 It is claimed that RPM can advance 
competition in three ways. 
First, a minimum retail price set by a franchisor can induce franchisees to compete 
aggressively on non-price criteria such as service and promotion in pursuing the super-
normal profits available. 87 Second, a minimum price may facilitate entry into a market by 
new firms and new products. Third, RPM can combat "free riding". 88 A firm may be a late 
entrant in the market and thereby avoid the development costs incurred by others or they 
may avoid the pre- and post-sale obligations of others who carry the cost of maintaining a 
product's reputation. 
Countering these views is the argument that there are ways of overcommg 
inefficiency problems that are less damaging to competition than RPM. Free riding, for 
example, can be overcome by exclusive distribution.89 
B Troublesome Features 
There are several troublesome features of RPM. First, it only applies to goods 
supplied for resale, not to goods that are merged or transformed. It is strange that the price 
of the output can be stipulated when the franchisor supplies the sauces but not the chicken. 
Secondly, it does not apply to services. A franchisor in a lawn mowing franchise can set 
standard prices. (Franchisors in these circumstances might still be found to be at fault under 
section 27.) Nor does it apply in an agency setting. An agent cannot sell at a discount 
against the wishes of the principal even when the discount is funded out of the agent's 
commission. Lottery and betting agents face termination of their agreements if they indulge 
in such practices, yet they operate on franchising principles. Finally, the Act permits the 
joint advertising of the price for resupply of collectively acquired goods. 90 This is not 
dissimilar to what a franchise network does in substance although it will not usually fall 
within the terms of the exemption. (It has been pointed out that the parties can agree on a 
price at which the goods will be advertised but not on the price at which they will be sold.91 
Not only is this distinction a fine one, as the authors acknowledge, it is also one which few 
business people could be expected to appreciate.) 
85 Dr Miles Medical Co v John D Park and Sons 220 US 373 
86 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust, 2"d ed., 177 
87 E. Gelhom, Antitrust Law and Economics in a Nutshell, 4th ed. , 295 
88 Hovenkamp, above n86, 181. 
89 Communication on the Application of the Community competition rules to vertical restraints-Follow-up to 
the Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, COM(98) 544, 19. 
90 Section 33(b) 
91 Penny Catley and Tanya Thompson, "Franchising and the Commerce Act" 1999 NZLJ 246, 247 
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C Summary 
Strong views are held on whether RPM should be illegal per se. Notable authorities 
fall in each camp. US Antitrust Attorney General William Baxter filed a brief on behalf of 
the Department of Justice in Monsanto 92 urging a review of the ban. On the other hand, 
Pengilley93 and most legislatures world-wide, consider it an entirely appropriate stance.94 It 
is doubtful whether a franchise in a competitive environment that employs RPM poses any 
threat to competition. The Commission has, in the past, acknowledged that RPM is not 
always pemicious95 but it is clear that the prohibition is unlikely to be relaxed. 
92 Monsanto Co., v Spray-Rite Co ., (1984) 465 US 752 
93 Pengilley, W, "Resale Price Maintenance law and dealership problems: Recent trends" 1990 NZLJ 66 
94 Italy appears to be the only OECD country in which RPM is not illegal. 
95 Ministry of Commerce, Review of the Commerce Act 1986, (1989), 12 
20 
VI HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS 
A The Economics 
Economic opinion holds horizontal restraints to have few redeeming features. Such 
restraints almost always exist because the parties have, or believe they have, some market 
power that they can exercise to their advantage. The effect is to maintain prices above the 
competitive level and restrict output. Economists therefore support the per se illegal status 
that is usually accorded such arrangements. 
B Market Allocation 
Competitors may agree to divide a market between them. In a territorial division 
scheme, each firm will only sell or provide services within its assigned territory. In a 
customer division scheme, firms agree upon the customers each will deal with. 96 Markets 
can also be divided along functional, product and time of sale lines. 97 Rarer forms of 
market allocation include market share agreements (firms agree on the percentage of sales 
each will make in a market) or output reduction schemes.98 
In the United States such restraints are illegal per se. The rule against horizontal 
territorial division was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 1990 when it struck down a 
territorial arrangement between two bodies over the bar review courses each offered. 
"One of the classic examples of a per se violation of s 1 ( of the Sherman Act) 
is an agreement between competitors at the same level of the market structure 
to allocate territories in order to minimise competition."99 
This case affirmed Topco, '00 in which the arrangements applying within an 
association of small supermarkets included agreements over exclusive territories. The claim 
that such an arrangement was pro-competitive because it enabled the supermarkets involved 
to compete with their much larger competition was rejected. Palmer and Topco involved 
territorial restraints but United States courts have applied the per se prohibition to customer, 
product, supplier and time of sale agreements. 101 
Under United States law franchises can infringe the prohibition on market allocation in 
the following ways. 
96 Tui Foods Ltd v NZ Milk Corporation (1993) 5 TCLR 406 had elements of this . Some franchisees supplied 
the route trade (dairies and supermarkets), others the home consumers. 
97 Paul G Scott, "Expanding the Scope of Section 30 of the Commerce Act 1986 to Include Market 
Allocation", Unpublished, 2-3. 
98 Hovenkamp, above n86, 76 
99 Palmer v ERG of Georgia, (1990) 498 US 46, 111 S.Ct. 401 
'
00 US v Topco Associates, Inc ., (1972) 405 US 596, 92 S.Ct. 1126 
'
0
' Scott, above n97, lists numerous citations at 25-26. 
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I Restraints agreed between franchisees 
Any overt or tacit arrangement between franchisees dividing a market is unlawful. 
In Sealy, 102 Topco and Palmer courts found that franchisees had colluded with each other. 
In each case only intrabrand competition was affected suggesting that in this area the 
distinction between interbrand and intrabrand competition is not significant. 103 Palmer also 
illustrates that the per se rule applies even though the parties had not been competitors prior 
to the agreement. It did not matter "whether the parties split a market within which both do 
business or whether they merely reserve one market for one and another for the other". 104 
However, agreements between franchisees who operate in the same product market but in a 
different geographic market would not be caught. Such agreements would seem to be 
unnecessary m any case. 
2 Franchisor imposed restraints 
As has been seen, 105 where these are genuinely imposed by the franchisor they will 
be treated as vertical restraints and generally tolerated unless shown to result in exclusion or 
collusion. The FTC investigation in Waterous1°6 concluded that the use of the exclusive 
dealing arrangements had created barriers to entry of such magnitude as to amount to de 
facto market allocation. 
3 Horizontal restraints in the form of vertical 
United States courts recognise three situations in which an ostensibly vertical 
restraint will be treated as horizontal, and therefore illegal per se. The first is where the 
restraint is imposed at the behest of the franchisees. 107 The second is where the franchisees 
own the franchisor. 108 The interrelationship between the parties means that they must be 
taken to be operating at the same level of the market. 
The third is in circumstances of split-level franchising. 109 This occurs when a 
franchisor directly operates outlets competing with franchisees. It may happen for several 
reasons. A franchisor may want remain close to the market; the franchisor may wish to 
experiment with new products or methods; she may wish to establish quality standards; or 
she may have trouble finding a new franchisee and be forced to operate the business herself. 
The danger in the practice is that courts may consider that any restrictions in place 
have the character of an agreement between competitors, that is, a horizontal arrangement 
and not a vertical one. Holiday Inns 110 had a "company town" policy under which it would 
operate hotels itself in certain towns rather than grant franchises. It was also a condition of 
its franchise agreement that a franchisee would not operate a hotel in a town containing a 
wz United States v Sealy Inc., (1967) 388 US 350 
103 It may be relevant to the matter of characterisation referred to page 23 . 
104 Palmer, above n99, 49-50 
105 Part IV above. 
106 Waterous, above n59. 
107 Sylvania, above n36, 58: Ryko Manufacturing Co. v Eden Services (1987) 823 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir.) 
108 Sealy, above n 102 
109 Also referred to as "dual distribution". 
110 American Motor Inns Inc. v Holiday Inns, Inc (1975) 521 F. 2d 1230 (3 rd Cir.) 
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Holiday Inn. The court held that Holiday Inns had entered into a horizontal conspiracy 
(agreement) with its franchisees. 
" .... [S]ince Holiday Inns, in one of its capacities, was dealing on the same 
market level as its franchisees, its contracts that, in effect, foreclosed such 
franchisees from operating either Holiday Inns on non-Holiday Inns in cities 
where Holiday Inns operated an inn, except with Holiday Inns ' permission, 
constitute market allocation agreements between competitors."111 
In a later case, 112 a KFC franchisee sued the franchisor (KFCC) after it decided to 
run new express outlets in Las Vegas itself, reversing earlier indications that it would allow 
the franchisee to expand its operation to do so. Las Vegas was a designated "company 
market" and KFCC had a "non-KFC" clause in its agreements prohibiting most franchisees, 
including the plaintiff, from any interest in another fast food operation while they remained 
a franchisee . The court's crucial finding was that both terms were imposed unilaterally: 
"the actions were implemented unilaterally by the franchisor, without involvement of any 
franchisees, and did not involve any type of concerted action".11 3 It was a vertical restraint 
and thus not a per se infringement. 
In New Zealand, the argument that the restraints could not be regarded as anti-
competitive because they were imposed unilaterally would not be available. In Port 
Nelson 114 the Court of Appeal held unilateral purpose was sufficient to establish purpose 
under section 27. Irrespective, it is unsatisfactory that the result in St. Martin should be 
reached by such a tortuous route. The character of the arrangement was virtually identical 
in the two cases yet in one it was rejected because of a perceived element of agreement 
between the franchisor, in her capacity as operator, and fellow franchisees. The focus 
should be on whether the practice in all the circumstances substantially lessened 
competition by foreclosing entry to competitors. 
Generally, United States courts examine the restraints closely in instances of split 
level franchising, considering factors such as the percentage of sales conducted through the 
franchisor's outlets and the limits placed on interbrand competition 115 before pronouncing 
the restraints horizontal or vertical. 
4 Proposed Amendment 
Currently, market allocation agreements are judged under section 27 but clause 3 of 
the Commerce Amendment Bill 1999 would deem them to substantially lessen competition. 
Given the consensus of economic opinion about the impact of such arrangements and their 
treatment in the United States, it might be thought that a court would have little difficulty in 
arriving at that conclusion anyway. However, precisely the same reasoning can be used to 
justify the Amendment. It is, in fact, the process that United States courts have gone 
through in classifying certain practices per se violations. 
111 Holiday Inns, above nl 10, 1253-54 
112 St. Martin v KFC Corporation (W D Ky. 1996) 935 F. Supp. 898 
11 3 St. Martin , above nl 12, 906 
11 4 Port Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission [1996] 3 NZLR 554 
115 Holiday Inns, above n 110 
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There is concern that the Amendment will have major impact on franchises, despite 
the clear intention that franchises should not be affected.116 Will franchisors and franchisees 
be at any greater risk under the Amendment than their American equivalents currently are? 
If it is interpreted literally the answer will be yes. There is nothing in the wording of the 
new provision that necessarily requires a court to distinguish between different types of 
restrictive agreements, whether on the basis of a vertical or horizontal dichotomy or 
otherwise. As drafted, it could be applied very widely. 
This will not occur, however, if courts interpret the provisions in keeping with the 
Act's intention. 
"[The Act] is legislation of a type where the Courts should not hesitate to adopt 
necessary purposive approaches in line with North/and Milk Vendors Association 
Inc v Northern Milk Ltd [1988] 1 NZLR 530 paying due respect to legislative 
policy."111 
Agreements that help rather than hinder competition should not be prohibited. The 
way of achieving such a result would be for the court to consider characterisation. This has 
been invoked in connection with tying118 and price fixing .11 9 It would be possible for courts 
to exclude certain territorial restraints, for example, from the prohibition on the basis that 
they are not the type of restraint that the provision is intended to cover. 
If this interpretative approach cannot be guaranteed, the provision would seem to 
require amendment if it is to be restricted to the activities of hard core cartels as intended. 
This will pose a drafting challenge. If the exemption is to be limited to franchising alone 
there will be difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory definition. 120 It is also likely to be 
contentious. Why should franchising alone among distribution methods be accorded special 
treatment? It would create the danger of franchising being used by those whose objective is, 
in fact, market allocation. Conversely, if the amendment is drawn in terms of exempting 
agreements between parties at different functional levels of the market, it will need to take 
account of the possibility of horizontal arrangements being disguised as vertical ones, such 
as in Waterous. 121 The formulation is likely to be complex. 
A problem will also exist in respect of split-level franchising. Under the present 
section 30(1)(a) "any bodies corporate that are interconnected with" any of the parties to an 
agreement are considered to be party to it also. As Scott points out, 122 this may have the 
effect of introducing a horizontal dimension to a vertical arrangement. An agreement with 
territorial provisions in it between a franchisor and her franchisees (vertical) will be 
considered one between franchisees (horizontal) when the franchisor is interconnected with 
one of the franchisees (for example when the latter is a subsidiary company). This removes 
the court's discretion to determine the nature of the restraint in the circumstances. 
116 Cabinet Paper ECO (98) 248, paragraph 21. 
117 Union Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd [1990] 2 NZLR 662, 700. 
118 Pait IV above. 
119 Part VI D below. 
120 Part II above. 
12 1 Waterous , above n59 
122 Scott, above n97 
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C Boycotts 
Section 29 was amended in 1990 by the addition of a requirement that at least one of 
those party to the exclusionary agreement also be in competition with the object of the 
action. The section would catch behaviour by a group of franchisees or a combination of 
franchisor and franchisees that tried to harm a competitor. But, would it also catch 
concerted action by franchisees against their franchisor, for example, where they wished to 
negotiate better terms for themselves? What if F &P dealers, with stock in hand, conspired 
to cut-off the company's supply of raw materials for a period? An unlikely scenario 
admittedly but one not without relevance in the United States. It appears that such action 
would not be caught in New Zealand because the franchisor would probably be regarded as 
being in a different market and therefore not in competition with her franchisees. In 
contrast, the action would be regarded as unlawful in the United States, the qualifying 
requirements for a boycott not requiring the parties to be in competition. 123 
D Price f,xing 
Franchisees are vulnerable to price fixing. Their interest in "standardising" prices 
will facilitate the conclusion that they have colluded when an issue arises. Moreover, the 
frequent networking common among franchisees provides them with the opportunity to 
conspire. In 1996, seven Toyota dealers in Auckland were fined $350,000 for standardising 
discounts discussed at regular dealer meetings. 124 "Parallelism" (following the market 
leader) within a franchise network is also unlikely to be plausible in the absence of 
movement in the wider product market. 125 
The severity of the per se illegal status has been mitigated by the use of 
characterisation. Firstly, in Radio 2UE 126 two radio stations that marketed themselves via a 
joint rate card were held not to have fixed prices largely, it seems, because they were free to 
change their individual prices. The court seemed to be influenced by the stations' small 
share of the market and that the combined rate card was likely to enhance their 
competitiveness. The Commission in The Insurance Counci/127 concerning knock for knock 
arrangements between insurance companies, adopted a similar approach. Both cases have 
been questioned for appearing to introduce by a side door a section 27 test into a provision 
considered to be a statutory embodiment of the US's per se prohibition. It is claimed the 
existence of a price fixing arrangement has been confused with its effects, 128 a distinction 
carefully drawn in Taylor Preston. 129 
123 St Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co v Barry 438 US 531 
124 Commerce Commission v North Albany Motors Ltd (HC, Auckland, 4 December 1996, Morris J, CP 88/94) 
125 Eagles, above n 17 
126 Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Stereo FM Pty Ltd (1982) ATPR 40-318 
127 Re The Insurance Council of New Zealand fnc ( 1989) 2 NZBLC 99,522 
128 M Blakeney and A Freilich, "The Per Se Prohibition on Price Fixing in Australia" ( 1986) 60 ALJ 668 
129 Commerce Commission v Taylor Preston Ltd [1998] 3NZLR 498 
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D Summary 
The impact of the proposed amendment on franchising is uncertain and potentially 
significant. Similarly, the operation of section 29 is uncertain but it is now so narrowly 
drawn that it is unlikely to be a serious problem to a franchise network except in cases of 
blatant exclusionary conduct. Price fixing can pose a problem for franchisees because of 
their close interrelationship but retailers generally are more aware of the prohibition. 
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VII THE EUROPEAN APPROACH 
A A Different Approach 
The European approach to distribution arrangements is different to New Zealand's. 
European law specifically recognises certain types of distribution systems, within defined 
limits, and accords them exemption from competition law. A seminal difference is the right 
of the regulator, the European Commission, 130 to exempt such arrangements en bloc. 
B Competition Law Framework 
The heart of European Community competition law lies in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty of Rome 1957. 131 The former declares, in part, that "all agreements .. decisions .. and 
concerted practices which may effect trade between Member States and which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition .. " to be "incompatible 
with the common market". Article 82 is directed against the misuse of dominant positions. 
They are similar to sections 27 and 36 of the Act in their focus . 
Article 81(1) is drawn very widely. Agreements falling within it are void 132 but the 
severity of this is mitigated in two ways. First, the de minim is doctrine excludes agreements 
that clearly pose no threat to competition. The Commission has produced guidelines that 
provide a safe harbour for vertical agreements between parties holding less than 10 per cent 
of the relevant market. 133 Second, there is provision for agreements to be exempted if they 
satisfy two positive and two negative conditions. An agreement can be exempted if it: 
(i) "contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress while 
(ii) allowing consumers a fair share of the benefit". 
If these criteria are met, the agreement can be exempted only if it also 
(iii) 
(iv) 
does not "impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives" and 
does not "afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition 
with respect to a substantial part of the products in question".134 
The Commission has the exclusive power to grant individual135 and block 
· 136 exempt10ns. 
130 In the sections dealing with Europe the European Commission is referred to as "the Commission". 
13 1 Originally Articles 85 and 86 but renumbered by Article 12 of the Treaty of Amsterdam 1998 
132 Article 81 (2) 
133 Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance [1997] OJ C 372/13 
134 Article 81 (3) 
135 Regulation 17 /62 
136 Regulation 19/65 
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C Case Law 
Franchising first became subject to judicial scrutiny in Pronuptia 137when the 
European Court of Justice held that clauses in a franchise agreement that were necessary to 
support the two essential ingredients of the franchising relationship fell outside the scope of 
Article 81(1). The first of these was the protection of know-how and expertise; the 
franchisor must be able to provide these to the franchisee with confidence that they will not 
fall into the hands of a competitor. On that ground, a franchisee could be prevented from 
opening a shop of the same or similar nature in an area where she might compete with 
another member of the network during the term of the agreement. The franchisee could also 
be prevented transferring her shop to another without the franchisor's approval. 
The second ingredient was the protection of the franchise's reputation. This justified 
terms requiring the franchisee to apply the franchisor's business methods and know-how, 
and to set up the premises in a prescribed fashion. The interest in uniform quality justified 
tying arrangements in circumstances where it was impractical to lay down objective quality 
specifications. 
In the two years following Pron71ttia, the Commission issued decisions approving 
franchise agreements for Yves Rocher, 13 Computerland, 139 ServiceMaster, 140 and Charles 
Jourdan 141 and granting exemptions. In each case, the market share of the franchise was 
low, not exceeding 10%, and it faced strong competition. Barriers to entry were also low. 
D Franchising Block Exemption 
Franchising is one of three types of distribution system covered by a block 
exemption (the other two are exclusive distribution and exclusive purchasing). Regulation 
4087 /88 142 is in two parts. The preamble presents franchising in a positive light and 
explains why it satisfies the four requirements of Article 81(3). Of the nine articles that 
define the precise terms and extent of the exemption the following are the most important. 
Article 1 confers the exemption of franchising agreements and contains the key 
definitions. 
Article 2 identifies five types of obligations that would normally be regarded as 
restrictions of competition but are within the exemption. Included are obligations on a 
franchisee to operate only from the contract premises and to refrain from active selling 
outside the allocated territory. 
137 Pronuptia de Paris v. Schillgalis Case 164/84 
138 OJEC No. L 8/49 10 January 1987 
139 OJEC No. L 222/1 2 10 August 1987 
140 OJEC No. L 332/28 3 December 1988 
141 OJEC No. L 35/31 7 February 1989 
142 Full title given in above nl 1 
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Article 3 contains the so-called "white clauses" that are not normally considered as 
restricting competition. There are two sets. One set concerns restrictions that a franchisor 
might use to maintain control over the use of her know-how or over the franchise's 
reputation. Examples include obligations on a franchisee to comply with standards for the 
presentation of premises and to ensure staff attend training courses. These are 
unconditionally permitted in agreements. The other set are obligations that will not prevent 
exemption if they are "necessary" to protect the franchisor's intellectual property rights or 
"to maintain the common identity and reputation" of the franchise. Examples include 
restrictions requiring the franchisee to sell the franchised goods only to end users or other 
franchisees and to offer for sale a minimum range of goods. 
Article 4 lays down three conditions that must be complied with before an 
agreement qualifies for exemption. One is that the franchisee is obliged to indicate its status 
as an independent undertaking. 
Article 5 contains a "blacklist" of seven prov1s10ns, including resale pnce 
maintenance. 
Article 8 empowers the Commission to withdraw an agreement's exemption where 
the agreement would have effects incompatible with Article 81 (3). Specifically, withdrawal 
is provided for in cases where territorial protection is awarded to the franchisee and other 
features are present that are conducive to market sharing. 
The Regulation is largely a codification of the case law that had developed based on 
P . 143 ronuptza. 
143 OECD Report, above n13 , 89. 
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VIII VERTICAL RESTRAINTS UNDER THE BLOCK EXEMPTION 
It must be remembered that the exemption applies only to agreements that would be 
considered business format franchises in New Zealand. It is also notable that there is little 
judicial authority on the application of the franchising exemption. 
A Exclusive Dealing 
Exclusive dealing is permitted but it is subject to conditions. A franchisee can be 
required not to sell or use goods competing with the franchisor's goods that are the subject 
matter of the franchise although this cannot be extended to spare parts or accessories. 144 
However, this must be read in conjunction with the first of the conditions contained in 
Article 4, namely, that a franchisee must be free to obtain the franchised goods from other 
franchisees or from another authorised distributor where the goods are distributed through a 
parallel network.145 Further, a blacklisted clause must also be considered. A franchisee 
cannot be prevented from obtaining supplies of goods of a quality equivalent to those 
offered by the franchisor from an independent source unless the restriction can be justified 
under Article 2-e, that is, the goods compete with those that are the subject matter of the 
fr h. 146 anc 1se. 
In Yves Rocher, the franchisee was required to stock only the franchisor's products 
and was restricted in the source of supply. The Commission accepted that that the 
obligation to sell only the franchisor's products was inherent in the nature of the distribution 
system. 
Outside a franchising context, the European approach to exclusive dealing has been 
more stringent than the American. 147 In the Spices case, 148 an exclusive dealing agreement 
that involved no more than 30% of the market for spices in Belgium was held to foreclose 
competition unduly. This can be compared to the result in Jefferson Parish. 149 
B Tying 
Tying has not been the subject of specific judicial attention in Europe. However, it 
is covered in the regulation. A franchisee can be required to sell goods manufactured by a 
third party designated by the franchisor in circumstances where it is impractical to apply 
objective quality specifications that another manufacturer could satisfy. 150 Also, a 
franchisee can be required to offer for sale a minimum range of goods. 15 1 However, both 
restrictions are permitted only in so far as they are necessary to protect the franchisor's 
intellectual property rights or maintain the identity and reputation of the franchise. 
144 Article 2-e. 
145 Article 4-a. 
146 Article 5-b. 
147 Ahdar, above n44, 24. 
148 The Community v Brooke Bond Liebig Ltd [1978] 2 CMLR 116 
149 Jefferson Parish , above n63 
150 Article 3-1-b. 
15 1 Article 3-1-f. 
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C Territorial Restrictions 
Since 1957 market integration has been an important objective of all Community 
law, competition law included. There is particular concern with "absolute territorial 
protection" in any system of exclusivity. The reason for this is not hard to appreciate. 
"[ A ]n agreement between producer and distributor which might tend to restore the 
national divisions in trade between Member States might be such as to frustrate the 
most fundamental objectives of the Community."152 
This concern has informed the European approach to territorial restraints which have 
proved a problem generally. However, franchising is an exception, it being recognised that 
"the limited territorial protection granted to the franchisees is indispensable to protect their 
investment". 153 Three restrictions on competition are permitted in a franchising context. 
First, territorial protection may be accorded to a franchisee by a franchisor. 154 Second, 
location clauses may restrict the franchisee to specified premises. 155 Third, the franchisee 
may be prevented from actively seeking customers outside the contract territory. 156 
However, there is also provision for the Community to withdraw the exemption if users are 
unable to obtain franchise goods because of their place ofresidence. 157 
D Resale price maintenance 
RPM is one of the blacklisted clauses. Article 5e prevents the exemption applying 
when the franchisee is restricted in the determination of the sale prices of the goods or 
services which are the subject matter of the franchise. Recommended prices are acceptable. 
The approach appears identical to that in New Zealand. 
E Summary 
The extent of exclusive dealing in a franchising context is clearly defined as is the 
permitted degree of tying. The latter is treated similarly to the view of Australian 
authorities discussed above. The permissible territorial restrictions are also well and 
reasonably generously defined, but are subject to the possibility of being overridden when 
accompanied by other restrictions favouring market allocation. Overall, it is doubtful 
whether their treatment is, in the end, more generous than in New Zealand. 
152 Consten and Grundig v Commission, Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, 13 July 1966, 339. 
153 Preamble, paragraph 10. 
154 Article 2-a. 
155 Article 2-c. 
156 Article 2-e. 
157 Article 8-c. 
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IX REFORM IN EUROPE 
A OECD Report 
This 1994 report was a major review of the economic effects of vertical restraints in 
franchising in member states. 158 One of its conclusions was that competition policy should 
have regard to market structure in deciding when a vertical restraint is acceptable. Vertical 
restraints "are very unlikely to harm economic efficiency or reduce competition in a 
properly defined market when its structure - its level of concentration, conditions of entry, 
and dynamics - insure that the franchise will face vigorous competition from other franchise 
systems or from products or services distributed in other ways."159 It recommended that 
policy towards franchising should recognise three distinct market situations: 
Franchisors with small market shares in unconcentrated upstream and downstream 
markets, and new or established franchisors attempting to enter a new market, could 
have quasi-automatic permission to include either non-price or price restrictions in 
their agreements. 
Franchise systems that are non-negligible and well established in their market could 
face a more detailed inquiry into the extent of competition in their market and, if 
then necessary, into the effects of proposed vertical restraints. 
Franchise systems with a dominant position in their market could require a more 
detailed justification to show that proposed vertical restraints do not pose substantial 
risks for interbrand competition, would enhance efficiency, and that comparable 
efficiency benefits cannot be realised with lower risks for interbrand competition. 
B Green Paper 
The OECD report was one factor causing a rethink in Europe on vertical restraints. 
Another was the turnaround in American thinkin~ that had occurred. Academic criticism of 
the European approach was a further influence. 1 0 The most pressing factor, however, was 
the need to determine the action to be taken when the various block exemptions expired at 
the end of 1999. The Commission, therefore, published a Green Paper on Vertical 
Restraints in 1997. 161 The most significant possible reform mooted involved the following 
market share ladder: 
• Below 10% market share, the agreement would be de minimis and Article 81(1) would 
not apply; 162 
• Between 10 and 20%, the agreement would be covered by a rebuttable presumption of 
compatibility with Article 81(1) unless it contained a minimum resale price 
158 OECD Report, above n13 
159 OECD Report, above n13, 14. 
160 B. Hawk, "System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law", CMLR 32 1995, 973. 
161 Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, January 1997 
162 Green Paper, above n161, paragraph 280 
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restriction, impediments to parallel trade or passive sales, or if the distribution 
agreement was concluded between competitors; 163 
• Between 20 and 40% market share, the agreement would be exempted pursuant to 
Article 81(3); 
• Between 40 and 50% market share, the agreement would not be covered by the block 
exemptions; the parties would have to file a notification; 
• The same would be true above 50% market share; a party with more than 50 per cent 
market share would normally be presumed dominant. 
The proposals were consistent with the OECD report but introduced market share as 
the criterion for assessing competition in the market. 
C Follow Up Communication 
The extensive consultation that occurred over the Green Paper led to a further 
Communication in September 1998. 164 This signalled a dramatic change of approach. 
First, the specific Block Exemption Regulations would be replaced by a single 
regulation covering all forms of vertical restraints. 
Second, whereas the existing Regulations contained "white lists" of the types of 
clauses in agreements that would be exempted, the new approach will be based exclusively 
on a "black list" of the clauses that cannot be exempted. Seven such clauses were specified, 
the principal ones being RPM, restrictions on exports or imports and restrictions on passive 
sales. 
Third, despite a lack of agreement among those consulted about the efficacy of 
market share tests, the Commission decided to use market share as the basic criterion for 
deciding whether an agreement can claim the benefit of the block exemption. The 
Communication was silent on what the threshold level would be because of disagreement 
among its Member States at that time but it has since confirmed that it will be set at 30%.165 
Fourth, the Commission intends to issue guidelines on how agreements above the 
30% threshold will be treated if submitted for clearance. It will also issue guidelines on 
how the exemption under the regulation may be withdrawn in certain cases. There is the 
suggestion that ultimately, in ten or fifteen years time, the regulation may simply be 
replaced by guidelines. 166 
163 Green Paper, above n161, paragraph 295 
164 Communication , above n89 
165 IP/99/286, 30 April 1999, <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.kshp> 
166 J Nazerali and D Cowan, "Reforming E.U. Distribution Rules - Has the Commission Found Vertical 
Reality?" [1999] ECLR 159, 161 
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In summary, the system means that any agreement, including a franchise agreement, 
containing vertical restraints will be considered outside the scope of Article 81(1) provided 
it does not contain any blacklisted clauses and the parties' combined market share does not 
exceed 30%. 
D Current Status 
On 30 April 1999 the European Council announced that it had reached "political 
agreement" on the two new regulations necessary to enable the Commission to complete the 
reform of policy "along the lines" set out in its Communication. 167 The first of these was 
adopted on 10 June 1999. 168 The draft Block Exemption was to be released for public 
consultation in July 1999 but it has yet to appear on the Internet. The stated intention is that 
the new rules should be applicable as from the beginning of 2000 but there is also 
speculation that the existing block exemptions will need to be extended. 169 
167 IP/99/286, above n 165 
168 Council Regulation No 1215/1999, <http://europa.eu.int/SG1/sga_doc> 
169 Nazerali and Cowan, above n166, 168. 
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X POLICY OBJECTIVES 
An appropriate policy framework for the development of an approach to franchising 
should based on the following primary objectives. 
A Certainty 
Certainty, clarity and predictability are goals sought in relation to all law but it 
applies especially in relation to commerce. First, as a mater of equity, competition law and 
other commercial law, should be explicable to the operators of Ma and Pa businesses as well 
as to those with the capacity to obtain specialist legal advice. Second, legal certainty and 
predictability encourages the taking of commercial risk because the legal risk is eliminated 
or minimised. Thirdly, certainty reduces transaction costs. Consultation over the Green 
Paper revealed legal certainty to be industry's highest priority. 
B Getting It Right 
The law should have the objective of ensuring that the line dividing permissible and 
prohibited conduct is drawn properly. This is the most important goal but also the hardest 
to achieve. 
First, it requires some agreement on what the goal of competition law is . Should the 
objective be the promotion of economic efficiency, the restraint of economic power, 
protection of independent businesses, or the promotion of consumer welfare? If there is a 
mix of goals, what is the appropriate balance between them? 
Second, the law should be capable of accommodating new forms of business 
operation. Business is dynamic, with technology and globalisation driving change. 
Competition law should allow sufficient scope for new developments to be assessed on their 
merits. For example, our competition law has developed against a background of product 
power, where the party higher up in the supply chain has been assumed to have the greater 
power (manufacturer over distributor, distributor over retailer). This decade has seen the 
emergence of retailer power, or product pull, where the large retailers as often as not dictate 
to the supplier and manufacturer. 
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C Enforcement 
Ideally, enforcement should be both effective and efficient. The law has to be able 
to deal with individual cases promptly and provide sufficient deterrence that practices 
clearly unacceptable are recognised as high risk by those contemplating them. 
D Administrative Efficiency 
Where interaction with the regulator is necessary it should be able to be completed 
quickly and at reasonable cost. This is related to the issue of certainty. 
E Secondary Objectives 
Treatment of franchising under competition law should be compatible with the way 
it is treated elsewhere. The most relevant other field is intellectual property, given that 
franchises often deal in intellectual property. Our law should also be as consistent as 
possible with Australian law. 
F Trade-Offs 
The reality is that all the above objectives cannot be satisfied. Very restrictive per se 
prohibitions promote certainty and enforcement efficiency but they do not serve the goal of 
drawing the boundaries correctly. Conversely, the latter goal is better served by an 
approach that evaluates each case on its facts to establish the actual impact on competition. 
The price of this, however, is a degree of uncertainty because it depends ultimately on the 
decisions of courts that are often poorly equipped to assess the issues involved. The 
corollary of a high degree of certainty is that only the most difficult cases will be referred to 
the regulator, meaning they are unlikely to be dealt with quickly. 
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XI THE APPROACHES EVALUATED 
A Certainty 
In New Zealand, three nominated practices excepted, agreements containing vertical 
restraints are only unlawful if they substantially limit competition. This superficial 
simplicity disguises the complexity of the analysis required to determine what constitutes 
substantial lessening of competition. Cases like F&P illustrate the difficulty that lawyers, 
economists and adjudicators have in evaluating the issues: what hope does the average 
business person have? A franchisee is likely to see fellow franchisees as part of her 
commercial whanau. The fact that the law regards them as being in competition comes as a 
considerable surprise. 170 
The rationale for the European block exemption approach is that it is the best way to 
provide certainty. 171 The system's purpose is to enable those entering distribution 
arrangements to know where they stand. It would seem largely to have achieved that 
objective. The lack of legal certainty under the system did not emerge as a problem in the 
consultation on the Green Paper. If so, this is a considerable achievement, and a necessary 
one given the size and scale of the European market. 
This certainty has come at a price. To qualify for the exemption, the European 
franchisor has had to ensure that the agreement satisfied all the provisions required by the 
Regulation. This has resulted in an emphasis on form rather than substance. Much of the 
drafting effort is aimed at ensuring that an agreement's form brings it within the exemption: 
much of the enforcement effort is directed at determining whether this has been achieved. 
The analysis of the economic impact of the agreement in total is pushed into the 
background. The result has been a straitjacketing of franchising as an organisational 
form. 172 The move to a single, comprehensive Regulation containing a black rather than a 
white and black list is seen as the way to overcome this problem. With these changes, the 
new system will establish a relatively simple, transparent framework likely to be understood 
by a reasonably intelligent and interested business person. This will be further enhanced if 
the guidelines promised by the Commission are of good quality. 
The use of market share as a fundamental tool has also been motivated partly by 
need to provide certainty. The claim is that a franchise will be able easily to gauge whether 
it qualifies for exemption or not. However, there are reasons to believe the certainty may be 
illusory. First, market definition precedes assessment of market share and it can be 
determinative. Du Pont's 75% share of the cellophane market became 20% of the market 
for "flexible packaging materials". 173 Second, market share information is not always clear 
cut and can be challenged. Third, markets are dynamic and market shares can change 
quickly. A franchise in a safe harbour today can be in hostile seas tomorrow. 
17° Catley and Thomson, above n91, 246 
171 Green Paper, paragraph 161, 55 
172 Communication, above n89, 27 
173 United States v £.I.Dupont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
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The European Commission acknowledges that market share is not a substitute for 
market power. 174 Nevertheless, it claims that some rule of thumb mechanism is necessary in 
the interests of legal certainty and market share is the best construct available. 175 The only 
alternative would be to issue comprehensive guidelines that would make it possible to use 
the full set of market factors for the assessment of vertical restraints, a change it considers 
"too radical". 176 It points out the use of market share thresholds in other contexts, such as 
mergers; and proposes special measures to accommodate some of the problems. 177 
Moreover, it points to the detailed guidelines on market definition it has produced. Only 
time will tell whether the confidence in market share thresholds is justified. 
It is noted that the scope for formalism has not been entirely eliminated. One of the 
items on the black list is the combination of selective and exclusive distribution with a ban 
on active sales. 178 Translated into more ordinary language this prohibits an arrangement 
whereby a distributor chosen by the supplier on specific criteria is appointed as the sole 
distributor in an area outside of which she is prohibited from selling the good or service 
concerned. 179 At least three components of this exception are open to interpretation, 
namely, selective distribution, exclusive distribution and active sales. For example, 
selective distribution normally involves dealers being chosen on qualitative criteria but 
exceptions where selection has been based on quantitative criteria have been recognised. 
Careful drafting will still be needed. 
The Commission's view is the vast majority of franchise agreements will obtain 
automatic exemption under the new system. 18 It describes franchising as "usually" a 
combination of selective distribution and obligations not to compete, with "sometimes" 
location clauses or territorial exclusivity added. These combinations will be able to be 
assessed according to the general criteria contained in the new Regulation. 181 However, it is 
difficult to reconcile this view with the terms of the blacklisted form of distribution 
described in the preceding paragraph. As the Commission itself states, many franchises use 
specific criteria in selecting franchisees; home electronics, perfume and motor vehicle 
dealerships are examples. Many franchisors also impose territorial restrictions for the 
reasons covered in Sylvania 182and other cases. It would seem that these arrangements 
would be caught by the black list. The possible treatment of location clauses and non-
competition clauses is also raising concern. 183 It seems that, in the short term at least, 
franchising may be exposed to a reduction in legal certainty. 
174 Communication, above n89, 21. 
175 Communication , above n89, 22 . 
176 Communication above n89, 22. 
177 For example, an exemption will continue for two years when the threshold is exceeded by less than 5%. 
178 Communication, above n89, 
179 An example might be a Chanel distributor appointed for, and confined to, Belgium. 
180 Nazerali and Cowan, above n166, 167. 
181 Communication, above n89, 32. 
182 Sylvania , above n36. 
183 Nazerali and Cowan, above n166, 166-7. 
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B Getting It Right 
The New Zealand approach is effects based. An agreement is evaluated in terms of 
its actual or potential effects on competition in the market. Decisions are made on real 
issues. This approach means that, generally, the correct decision will be made in each 
individual case. It also increases the possibility of new forms of distribution being 
permitted because they will be specifically evaluated in terms of their impact, taking 
account of their pro-competitive effects and the public benefit. Moreover, the landmark 
case, Fisher & Paykel, 184 demonstrated a tolerant attitude. 
In contrast, the European system has only partly been effects based. This is 
illustrated by the fact that a firm with a clearly dominant position in a market (market share 
approaching 100%) could nonetheless be exempted under the system if its agreement 
satisfied the requirements of the Regulation. Conversely, a firm with no market power 
could be denied exemption under the block arrangements if one of the clauses in its 
agreement infringed. The system provided for decisions to be made on individual cases but 
the reality has been that the time and cost involved in making an application has meant that 
the emphasis is always placed on trying to come within the block exemption. Perversely, 
therefore, a system that was intended to help business has hindered it because of its 
inflexibility. 
This tendency to "straitjacket" distribution systems, thus stifling innovation, 
emerged as the major criticism in the consultation on the Green Paper. 185 A strong 
consensus emerged for a change to an economic effects system, a change that the 
Community has now agreed to. This move, described as "profound", 186 is an 
acknowledgement of the failure of the formalistic line drawing that the previous system 
encouraged. (Nonetheless, as indicated, the scope for line drawing has not been eliminated 
and old habits can be expected to die hard, especially in the European Community 
bureaucracy.) 
It should also be noted that the treatment of vertical restraints is likely to remain 
controversial, notwithstanding the reform. The United Kingdom's new Competition Act 
1998 contains a provision empowering the Secretary of the Board of Trade to exclude or 
exempt vertical agreements from the equivalent of our section 27. The United Kingdom 
Government's view is that all vertical restraints except resale price maintenance should be 
exempted. It has already released a draft Order in which it has not followed the 
Commission's approach by avoiding any use of market share thresholds. It aims to have 
this in place when the Act comes into force in March 2000. 187 This is possibly a position 
adopted for the purposes of the negotiations that must occur over the final shape of the new 
European system. 
184 Fisher & Paykel, above n26. 
185 Communication, above n89, Section II, 7 
186 Communication, above n89, 27 
187 Nazerali and Cowan, above n166, 168. 
39 
C Administrative Efficiency 
The difference in scale between New Zealand and Europe is shown in the fact that 
the Commerce Commission has received around 60 applications for authorisation of a 
restrictive trade practice since the Act came into effect in 1987. By contrast, the 
competition arm of the European Commission, DGIV, is currently facing a backlog of over 
1,000 claims for exemption from Article 81(1) with the prospect of more as the Union 
increases its Eastern European membership. Streamlining the system administratively is 
one of the main goals of the reforms being implemented. The main change is that whereas 
currently agreements can only be exempted from the date of notification, in future they will 
be able to be exempted from the date of the agreement. It will enable companies to enter 
into agreements and notify subsequently, with the possibility of any exemption being 
backdated. Both positions contrast with the New Zealand situation where a practice can 
only be authorised from the date of a determination. 188 
D Enforcement 
The creation of a reasonably high threshold in Europe should reduce the number of cases 
that will require enforcement attention. Generally, the reforms represent a move toward a 
level of permissiveness not dissimilar to New Zealand. 
188 Section 59. 
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XII CONCLUSIONS 
The European Union is a market of over 300 million people, New Zealand's market 
is under 4 million. Europe continues to strive for an integrated market whereas New 
Zealand already has a single market. Care is obviously needed in drawing lessons from 
Europe for application in New Zealand. With this caveat, the following conclusions are 
advanced. 
Firstly, European experience 1s confirmation that an economic effects-based 
approach is the appropriate one. Ultimately, the necessity to evaluate the effect of 
agreements on competition cannot be avoided. An effects-based approach is the one most 
likely to yield the correct decision in individual cases. A jurisprudence developed on the 
basis of decisions on the effects in specific cases is also more likely to accommodate 
changes in distribution systems over time. 
Secondly, the converse is that a form-based approach will ultimately fail. Such an 
approach has attractions because of the legal certainty it offers but the European experience 
demonstrates how the focus inevitably shifts to form rather than substance. Attention is 
distracted from the primary issue to the secondary. 
Thirdly, definitions are the Achilles heel of a form-based approach. The first 
problem is in finding workable definitions. The classification of distribution systems in 
economic terms is difficult and their translation into law even harder. The definition of joint 
venture in our Act illustrates this. 189 It is drawn very narrowly and almost certainly 
excludes ventures that should receive the benefit of the exemption from the price fixing it 
offers.190 The second problem is that enshrining definitions in law tends to freeze them in 
time. The law is unable to adjust adequately to changes in commerce. These problems are 
by-passed if the focus is on effects. Classifications of distribution systems may be helpful 
in analysis but are unsuitable as the basis of law or policy. 
Fourthly, the European experience illustrates the trade-offs that need to be made 
between desirable policy objectives. The objective of legal certainty has necessitated the 
use of a market share threshold rather than the publication of a comprehensive list of the 
factors that would be taken into account in determining the effects of an agreement. 
Administrative efficiency has required the introduction of a power to backdate exemptions 
although it risks tolerating for a period agreements that are subsequently found to be anti-
competitive. 
Fifthly, the reforms are based on a sound theoretical underpinning. The Europeans 
have accepted the economic learning of recent years that the acceptability of vertical 
restraints depends on the strength of competition in the market concerned. The emphasis 
placed on assessing the market power of the parties is correct, in the author' s opinion. If the 
method of implementation is open to challenge, the conceptual basis is not. 
189 Section 31 (l)(a). 
190 Scott, above n97 
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Sixthly, the reforms show an admirable concern for legal certainty. The architects 
have set out to establish a safe harbour. The :framework they have produced is relatively 
simple, using a bright-line threshold and a black list of prohibitions. Market share, the 
mechanism used to define the safe harbour, is a well-established concept used in other areas 
of competition policy. The promised guidelines may further enhance legal certainty. 
Seventhly, little emerges from the reforms in terms of enforcement or administrative 
efficiency. The streamlining that is occurring with the latter appears to be driven by 
necessity rather than principle. It is not a model to be adopted in New Zealand. 
Overall, the judgment is that the restrictive practices found in :franchising would not 
be better regulated in New Zealand by the adoption of the proposed European system. 
Although the issue of a satisfactory definition of franchising will henceforth be avoided, the 
European system is still complex. The effectiveness of market share thresholds is likely to 
be limited in our environment where high concentration of market power tends to occur. 
Franchises in New Zealand are better off under our type of effects based system, especially 
while Fisher & Paykel remains the leading authority. Guidelines would be useful, however, 
especially as franchising can be expected to continue growing rapidly. They exist in New 
Zealand for business acquisitions. It seems reasonable that guidelines be formulated for 
restrictive practices. 
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